Research
For an indeterministic ethics. The emptiness of the rule in dubio pro vita and life cessation decisions
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* Corresponding author: Dragan Pavlovic pavlovic@uni-greifswald.de
Department of Anaesthesiology and Intensive Care Medicine, Ernst Moritz Arndt University, Greifswald, Germany
Philosophy, Ethics, and Humanities in Medicine 2009, 4:6 doi:10.1186/1747-5341-4-6
Published: 14 May 2009Abstract
It is generally claimed that there exist exceptional circumstances when taking human life may be approved and when such actions may be justified on moral grounds. Precise guidelines in the medical field for making such decisions concerning patients who are terminally ill or have irreparable injuries incompatible with a bearable life, are difficult to establish. Recommendations that take the particular logical form of a rule, such as "in dubio pro vita", "when in doubt favour life") have been suggested and in some countries incorporated into legal texts (Germany). We claim here that such a rule is of no value since it is open-ended and always allows for doubt, and a decision to employ measures that would support human life could always be argued to be a valid choice. Preservation of this rule could be encouraged, but giving it the force of law may put physicians at risk, as they may be challenged for choosing to terminate life in otherwise ethically and medically uncontroversial circumstances.